Underperformance of founder-led firms: An examination of compensation contracting theories during the executive stock options backdating scandal
- Brian T. Carver,
- Brandon N. Cline(corresponding author),
- Mississippi State University,
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Abstract
<p>Using the executive stock option (ESO) backdating scandal as a backdrop, this paper examines whether compensation committees can effectively set executive compensation contracts in the presence of a founding CEO. Analyzing a sample of firms accused of backdating ESO grant dates and a control sample of non-backdating firms, we find evidence suggesting that managerial power influences the decision to backdate. Specifically, our analysis indicates the presence of a founder CEO increases the likelihood that ESOs are backdated by 22%. We further find that founder-led firms strongly underperform a matched sample of non-backdating firms. This finding contrasts a number of studies that document superior operating and stock return performance for founder-led firms.</p>
Bibliographic Information
Output type
Research Output:
Contribution to journal
Article
Research
Peer-reviewOriginal language
EnglishPages from-to (Number of pages)
Pages 294-310 (17 pages)Journal (Volume, Issue Number)
Journal of Corporate Finance (Volume 23)Publication milestones
- Published - 12/2013
Publication status
Published - 12/2013
ISSN
0929-1199Publication IDs
- Scopus: 84884740588
