Priority Monism, Partiality, and Minimal truthmakers

A. R. J. Fisher

Philosophy

Research Output: Contribution to journal Article Peer-review

Abstract

Truthmaker monism is the view that the one and only truthmaker is the world. Despite its unpopularity, this view has recently received an admirable defence by Schaffer (Philos Q 60(239):307-324, 2010b). Its main defect, I argue, is that it omits partial truthmakers. If we omit partial truthmakers, we lose the intimate connection between a truth and its truthmaker. I further argue that the notion of a minimal truthmaker should be the key notion that plays the role of constraining ontology and that truthmaker monism is not necessary for an appropriate solution to the problem of finding truthmakers for negative truths. I conclude that we should reject truthmaker monism once and for all.

Access to documents

10.1007/s11098-014-0314-z

Bibliographic Information

Output type

Research Output: Contribution to journal Article Peer-review

Original language

English

Pages from-to (Number of pages)

Pages 477-491

Journal (Volume, Issue Number)

Philosophical Studies

Publication milestones

Published - 2015

Publication status

Published - 2015

Publication IDs

ORCID: /0000-0001-5351-4521/work/83161433
Scopus: 84896570312