Skip to search boxSkip to navigationSkip to main content
Logo Gonzaga University

Against Moral Individualism: Special Relations and the Agent-Neutral/Agent-Relative Distinction

Research Output:
Contribution to journal
Article
 Peer-review

Abstract

A central tenet of moral individualism is that only an entity’s intrinsic (non-relational) properties can ground moral status because only intrinsic properties give rise to agent-neutral reasons. However, I show that the two main approaches to making the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction fail to exclude morally salient relational (extrinsic) properties from giving rise to agent-neutral reasons. As such, moral individualism accounts of moral status are false. Further, arguments that depend on moral individualism’s central tenet—like the argument from “marginal” cases—are unable to defend their thesis by merely claiming that special relations cannot ground moral status.

Access to documents

Bibliographic Information

Output type

Research Output:
Contribution to journal
Article
 Peer-review

Original language

American English

Pages from-to (Number of pages)

Pages 33-55

Journal (Volume, Issue Number)

Social Theory and Practice (Volume 50, Issue 1)

Publication milestones

  • Published - 01/2024

Publication status

Published - 01/2024

ISSN

0037-802X