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Involuntary evil and the socratic problem of double ignorance in Proclus

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Abstract

In his Commentary on the Alcibiades I Proclus often discusses and links the peculiar epistemological category of "double ignorance" (ignorance of ignorance combined with the conceit to knowledge) with evil and grievous error. To understand this more fully, the following analyzes Proclus' concept of double ignorance, its characteristics and its causes. Markedly, due to his understanding of double ignorance, Proclus offers a response to the "Socratic" idea that no one willingly errs as this particular category of not-knowing enables him to explain how individuals, despite desiring and in some sense knowing the good, fail or 'miss the mark' in articulating and doing the good.

Bibliographic Information

Output type

Research Output:
Contribution to journal
Review article
Peer-review

Original language

English

Pages from-to (Number of pages)

Pages 27-53 (27 pages)

Journal (Volume, Issue Number)

International Journal of Platonic Tradition (Volume 9, Issue 1)

Publication milestones

  • Published - 10/03/2015

Publication status

Published - 10/03/2015

ISSN

1872-5082

Publication IDs

  • Scopus: 84926198896