Intergovernmental Organizations, Interaction, and Member State Interest Convergence

This article presents a general theory of how the interaction of state agents within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) leads to a convergence in member state interests over time. The theory is based on the notion that, all else being equal, IGOs that facilitate more interaction between individuals from various states are conducive to greater member state interest convergence over time because there are more opportunities for agents from one or more member states to persuade agents from other member states to accept new ideas that affect how they define their states’ interests. I argue that such persuasion does not necessarily have to involve a shift in state identities but can also involve a diffusion of ideas about cause-and-effect relationships. Also, by focusing on IGOs as structures within which state agents interact, I argue against a narrow focus on socialization defined as the induction of new members into community norms. I present three hypotheses regarding which institutional attributes are conducive to member state interest convergence and test them using an original IGO data set. The findings are supportive of my general theory but provide some interesting support for existing theory that runs counter to one of the hypotheses presented here.