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Examination of Merricks' Primitivism about Truth

Research Output: Contribution to journal Article Peer-review

Abstract

Trenton Merricks (2007) argues for and defends a novel version of primitivism about truth: being true is a primitive monadic but non-intrinsic property. This examination consists of the following triad: a critical discussion of Merricks’ argument for his view, a rejection of his objection against Paul Horwich’s (1998) minimalist theory of truth, and a direct objection against his view on the grounds that it entails being true is a mysterious and suspicious property. The conclusion is that Merricks’ primitivism should be rejected.

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Bibliographic Information

Output type

Research Output: Contribution to journal Article Peer-review

Original language

English

Pages from-to (Number of pages)

Pages 281-298

Journal (Volume, Issue Number)

Metaphysica

Publication milestones

  • Published - 2014

Publication status

Published - 2014

Publication IDs

  • ORCID: /0000-0001-5351-4521/work/83161436
  • Scopus: 84922012478